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FINANCIAL DISINTERMEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS AND GLOBAL 
BANKS FUNDING MODELS
This paper investigates the process of financial disintermediation in international markets 
after the global financial crisis. Since the outbreak of the crisis, global banks are reducing their 
cross-border positions, this way reversing their large expansion in the period 2000-2008. 
Global banks funding structures are shifting in parallel, with a sharp and protracted reduction 
in wholesale funding. We test whether this trend towards more stable funding patterns 
explains the contraction in cross-border bank financing, using a panel of 56 countries, for the 
period 1991-2013. We find that net redemptions of banks’ international debt or the declining 
activity of global banks’ branches in the US important drivers of the process. We highlight 
next how, in some regions, financial disintermediation is a defining feature of the post-crisis 
international markets. International capital markets have gained importance as source of 
external financing for private borrowers headquartered in emerging economies, supported by 
easy monetary conditions in advanced economies. The potential implications of such process 
for financial stability have raised concerns. Assessing them requires further information on 
bond holders’ investment profiles, and borrowers’ financial soundness.
The process of financial integration experienced a turning point after the global financial crisis. 
Global banking is today described by cross-border fragmentation. Cross-border bank claims 
are experiencing a sustained and deep contraction which lasts since the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis. The contraction of cross-border interbank claims is sharper, but cross-border 
claims vis-à-vis non banks have also remained subdued – Chart 1 –. It is also apparent in this 
chart how non-financial corporations’ debt issuances at international markets have increased 
protractedly, in the same period. Issuances are nearly three times higher than in 2008, and 
have reached an all-time high after the global financial crisis.1 Financial disintermediation 
seems therefore a defining feature of the post-crisis international markets.
The process of cross-border bank deleveraging is a reversal of the rapid expansion of banks’ 
cross-border activity in the period 2000-2008, which was fostered by the development of 
1  Introduction
SOURCE: BIS.
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1  Cross-border bank deleveraging also contrasts with the resilience of other models of internationally expansion. For 
instance, banking subsidiaries’ local claims have grown, a development attributed to the stability of their funding 
models, based on local liabilities and capital [CIEPR (2012)].
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centralized funding structures. Banking groups headquartered in a number of advanced 
economies, in particular euro area countries, obtained wholesale funding in international 
markets, and invested them worldwide [CGFS (2010c), McCauley, McGuire and Von Peter 
(2010), Shin (2012)]. Today, these global banks funding structures are shifting in parallel to 
cross-border bank deleveraging.2 Wholesale funding is contracting, as part of broader shifts 
towards more stable funding sources. 
These shifts in banks’ funding patterns are particularly relevant in financial centres [Serena 
and Valdeolivas (2014)]. Global banks’ branches in the US, which were used as funding 
vehicles during the period 2000-2008, are no longer a source of financial resources for 
their banking groups [Goulding and Nolle (2012)]. EU and US banks branches in offshore 
centres such as Hong-Kong are experiencing similar changes (HKMA (2013). The changes 
in international funding patters are broad, and are not limited to these few, although 
relevant, financial centres [Caruana and Van Rixtel (2012)]. Banks international net 
issuances are contracting sharply on an aggregate basis. Cross-border interbank liabilities 
are also contracting, in particular by banks headquartered in advanced economies 
[García-Luna and Van Rixtel (2014)]. Global banks activity from financial hubs remains 
subdued. Regulatory reforms, either at the global level, or in home and host countries, are 
among the main underlying factors [Tarullo (2012, 2014), CGFS (2010c), Gambacorta and 
Van Rixtel (2013)]. Therefore, this trend towards more stable funding models is probably 
of permanent nature. Global banks which expanded overseas by establishing locally 
funded and capitalized subsidiaries have been more resilient.
In stark contrast with global banks’ cross-border deleveraging, international capital markets 
show a strong dynamism. International issuances – bonds issued by non-residents, in all 
markets –, have increased, particularly in emerging economies [Goodhart (2014), Turner 
(2014)]. It has been suggested that banks could be “losing ground” in favour of international 
capital markets [BIS (2013), Deutsche Bank (2014)].
These developments pose a number of interesting, unexplored, and pressing questions. Are 
cross-border bank disinvestments driven by the contraction in global banks international 
wholesale funding? Are capital markets counterbalancing global banks cross-border 
deleveraging? And, which are the implications for the transmission of global liquidly across 
borders? 
The objective of this paper is to shed light on these issues. We will argue that banking 
fragmentation reflects, to some extent, a post-crisis reassessment of global banks 
business models. Banks are obtaining less funding from international wholesale markets. 
These changes have global reach implications, frequently overlooked. International 
wholesale funding was instrumental to finance cross-border activity. Accordingly, its 
shrinking importance could be a driver of cross-border bank deleveraging. 
We investigate econometrically this hypothesis, building on a database comprising 
quarterly data for 56 countries, emerging and advanced, for the period 1991-3Q2013. Our 
results suggest that new funding patterns are among the key factors behind the sharp 
contraction in cross-border bank flows, and therefore impacting on financial integration. 
2  Global bank are those which have any activity of international reach -outside the country where the parent bank is 
headquartered. They are also known as internationally active banks. Global banks can expand abroad using different 
models [McCauley et al. (2010)]. We are implicitly focusing on the so-called international banks, which expand 
through cross-border investments, and centralized funding. Multinational banks are another typology of global 
banks, not analyzed in this article. They expand overseas by establishing subsidiaries, with a decentralized funding 
structure. Foreign subsidiaries are locally funded and capitalized, so multinational banks gain international. 
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We show next how heightened activity in capital markets, coupled with the steady 
shrinkage of cross-border banking activity, has implied, from the perspective of recipient 
countries, a shift in the composition of their external financing. There is an ongoing trend 
towards financial disintermediation: countries obtain less international financing from 
banks, and more from capital markets. Geographical breakdowns show that, in areas such 
as Emerging Asia or Latin America, capital markets have gain relative importance relative 
to banks’ cross-border credit. In these countries, non-financial corporations’ issuances 
have reached all-time high volumes. It remains open whether this substitution is short-
lived, since other factors, such as the accommodative monetary policy in advanced 
economies, have been supportive [Lo Luca et al. (2014)]. Moreover, for some borrowers, such 
as SMEs, capital markets could be an imperfect substitute of cross-border bank financing 
[Larosière (2013)]. The increasing access to capital markets by banks headquartered in 
emerging economies is also remarkable. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe in detail how 
global banks funding in international markets is decreasing after the global financial crisis. 
In Section 3, we investigate econometrically the impact of these shifts on cross-border 
bank investments. In Section 4, we depict the main changes in financial integration after 
the global financial crisis. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss the main implications of these 
trends, and the questions they open. Large international debt issuances pose risks, either 
overborrowing or currency mismatches. Bond markets could be new carriers of global 
liquidity. The impact of tightening of global liquidity conditions on bond holders investment 
decisions would depend on the investors risk profile, investment horizon, or leverage. 
In this section we discuss how global banks have reduced their reliance on international 
wholesale financing. Wholesale international financing was instrumental to finance global 
banks cross-border expansion. Therefore the current decline in international financing is a 
reversal of the previous process, and has far-reaching implications for financial integration. 
Whole sale funding refers to all financing from non-retail sources. Retail funding are mostly 
small, insured deposits, and similar instruments, such as promissory notes. Wholesale funding 
includes a wide range of financial instruments: debt instruments, interbank loans, and any 
other liabilities versus institutional investors.3 
The trend towards more stable funding patterns is being analyzed at length, using 
consolidated balance sheets – see for instance, IMF (2013), for a global analysis, or ECB 
(2012), for an analysis of euro area developments –.
We focus instead on the international dimension. Global banks usually tap wholesale funding 
in international markets, either by issuing debt in international markets, through cross-border 
interbank loans, or by using branches in key financial centres as funding vehicles. 
International funding patters are not easy to analyze systematically, so we use two different 
approaches. We show first descriptive evidence on global banks branches activity in key 
financial centres, such as US and Hong-Kong. As a second step, we show evidence on 
aggregate funding patterns of global banks in international markets, either through debt 
issuance, or through cross-border interbank financing. Both approaches suggests global 
banks have decreased their wholesale funding in international markets. 
2  Global banks funding 
patterns after the 
global financial crisis
3  Wholesale funding can have different maturities, or degree of stability, which are not discussed in this section 
[see Chen et al. (2012)].
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The US financial market has been for years a key funding location for non-US international 
banks. The depth of its financial markets and the prominence of the US dollar as currency 
of invoice make it an attractive financial centre. Global banks’ branches in the US have 
therefore an important role as funding vehicles of their banking groups.4 
Their activity has experienced two dramatic shifts despite the apparent stability of 
branches’ activities - their balance sheets have increased in size since the onset of the 
global financial crisis. These shifts have to do with the balance sheets composition, as 
shown in Chart 2 [see Goulding and Nolle (2012) for a detailed analysis]. 
2.1  BRANCHES OF FOREIGN 
BANKS IN KEY FINANCIAL 
CENTRES
4  Foreign banking offices in the US are either branches (and agencies) or subsidiaries. Foreign-owned subsidiaries 
are US commercial banks, of which a foreign banking organization owns at least 25 percent. US branches and 
agencies of foreign banks are incorporated in their foreign banking organizations. Foreign-owned subsidiaries 
and US branches of foreign banks have very different activities, analyzed in detail in Goulding and Nolle (2012).
SOURCE: US Financial Accounts; 4.30 Assets and Liabilities of U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks.
a 3GDBG@QSRGNVRSGDRHFMHjB@MSBG@MFDRHMSGD@BSHUHSXNE42AQ@MBGDRNE%NQDHFM!@MJR.QF@MHY@SHNMR"G@QSR@MCAQD@JCNVM42AQ@MBGDRA@K@MBD
RGDDS@RCDS@HKDCHMBG@QS@ANUD@RRDSR@QDAQD@JCNVMHMA@MJBQDCHSRDBTQHSHDRKN@MR@MCKD@RDRHMSDQA@MJKN@MRB@RG@RRDSRSQ@CHMF@RRDSR@MCNSGDQ
@RRDSR+H@AHKHSHDR@QDAQNJDMCNVMHMVGNKDR@KDCDONRHSRANQQNVHMFRSQ@CHMFKH@AHKHSHDR@MCNSGDQKH@AHKHSHDR-DS#TDSNONRHSHNMRUHR@UHRQDK@SDCENQDHFMNEjBDR
HMSDQNEjBDB@MADDHSGDQ@RNTQBDNEETMCHMFNQ@MTRD"G@QSYNNLRHM-DS#TD3N/NRHSHNMR@ONRHSHUDU@KTDQDkDBSR@MDSBQDCHSNQONRHSHNMNEAQ@MBGDR
UHR@UHRSGDHQA@MJHMFFQNTORVGHKD@MDF@SHUDU@KTDHLOKHDR%!.2@QDHLONQSHMFETMCHMFEQNLSGDHQA@MJHMFFQNTOR3GD@FFQDF@SD-DS#TD3N/NRHSHNMB@MAD
AQD@JCNVMADSVDDMAQ@MBGDRVHSG@MDSCDASNQONRHSHNMUHR@UHRSGDHQA@MJHMFFQNTORQDOQDRDMSDC@RSGDQDCKHMD@MCAQ@MBGDRVHSG@MDSBQDCHSNQONRHSHNM
UHR@UHRSGDHQA@MJHMFFQNTOQDOQDRDMSDCVHSG@AKTDKHMD(MSGDK@RSSVNXD@QRAQ@MBGDRVHSG@BQDCHSNQONRHSHNMG@UDCDBQD@RDCHSRSD@CKX@SSGDR@LDSHLD
AQ@MBGDRVHSG@CDASNQONRHSHNM@QDHLONQSHMFK@QFDQ@LNTMSRNEjM@MBHMFEQNLSGDHQA@MJHMFFQNTOR
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Panel 2.4 present a stylized balance sheet. Assets are classified either as bank credit 
(securities, loans and leases, and interbank loans), cash assets, or trading assets. Liabilities 
are classified either as wholesale deposits, borrowed funds, and trading liabilities. 
Branches of foreign banks cannot take retail deposits from US citizens or residents, so all 
funding is wholesale. 
Net Due To (NDT) positions vis-à-vis (foreign) relate banking offices are a key item to track 
branches activity. In panel 2.4, NDT positions are included in the right-hand-side of the 
balance sheet. However, they can be either an use (asset), or a source (liability). If branches 
are providing financial resources to their banking groups overseas, NDT positions are 
positive, and therefore constitute an asset. If branches are net importers of financing, NDT 
positions are negative, and booked as a liability.
The evolution of assets and liabilities is shown in panels 2.1 and 2.2. Branches obtained 
the bulk of funding from wholesale deposits and borrowed funds, in the period 2000-2008. 
Part of this funding was channelled abroad, to their banking groups. Therefore branches 
NDT positions vis-a-vis related banking offices were an asset. Such net creditor position 
reached its peak in mid-2008, when accounted to 35% of the balance sheet. The remaining 
assets were allocated to bank credit. Cash holdings were negligible. 
The first remarkable change after the crisis has to do with the branches financial position 
vis-à-vis their banking groups. Branches decreased the funds channelled towards their 
banking groups, so that in mid-2011, NDT positions vis-à-vis their banking groups became 
a liability (apparent in panel 2.2). This net debtor position has widened since then, reflecting 
that branches are obtaining funding from their banking groups, overseas. 
The aggregate NDT position can break down between creditor and debtor branches. Due 
from related foreign offices (interoffice assets) aggregate the NDT positions of branches 
with net claims vis-à-vis their banking groups. Due to related foreign offices (interoffice 
liabilities) include the positions of branches with net liabilities. 
Panel 2.3 shows these two measures, and also the aggregate NDT position (previously 
included in panels 2.1 and 2.2). Branches with net creditor positions vis-à-vis their 
banking groups have decreased the funding channelled overseas. This is an underlying 
factor behind the contraction in aggregate creditor NDT positions. The increase in the 
funds obtained by branches with a net debtor position vis-à-vis their banking groups 
is a second factor. The joint effect is the dramatic shift in the activity of branches of 
foreign banks. 
The increasing volume of cash assets held in the Federal Reserve is the second 
remarkable shift in US branches activity. The increase is so sizable that cash holdings 
already represent the bulk of branches assets. Hence, branches investment profile has 
became more conservative: much of their funding, either domestically-obtained or 
received from overseas, is hoarded in the Federal Reserve cash vaults [McCauley and 
McGuire (2014)]. 
It is not possible to ascertain which branches have decreased their funding overseas. 
However, we can break down their assets under management according to the nationality 
of their banking groups (Chart 3). The shrinking balance sheet of European branches 
suggests they might be those under retreat. The combined assets of French, German, and 
UK banks, was well above 1 trillion dollars in 2008. At the end of 2012, their assets represented 
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only 600 US bn. The volume of assets Japanese, Canadian, or Australian, branches has, on 
the contrary, increased. They can be amongst those increasingly present in US financial 
markets, focused on hoarding liquidity in the Federal Reserve. 
A similar declining role of branches as funding vehicles of their banking groups is observed 
in other key financial centres, such as Hong-Kong. Chart 4 presents the Hong-Kong 
Monetary Authority classification of EU and US branches according to their activity. They 
are classified in four groups: branches focused on funding overseas offices with customer 
deposits (group 1); funding overseas offices by unrelated banks’ deposits (group 2); 
branches akin to liquidity management centres (group 3); and loan providers (4). Branches 
classified as loan providers have increased to 13 – well above the 5 branches classified 
as loan providers before the crisis –. Branches classified as funding vehicles of overseas 
offices have decreased to 4, while before the crisis 11 branches were used as funding 
vehicles by their banking groups. 
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We turn now to the analysis of global banks aggregate funding patterns in international 
markets: international bond issuances, cross-border interbank liabilities, and global banks 
activity in financial hubs. 
BIS securities data track net international issuances, classifying banks according to the 
nationality of their banking groups. The information is compiled on a national basis, so that 
issuances by foreign subsidiaries, branches, or vehicles are classified according to the 
nationality of the ultimate owner of the entity. Therefore, international bond issuances are 
those in which the ultimate issuer is not headquartered in the market of issuance. 
Chart 5 shows the protracted contraction of net aggregate international issuances –represented 
by the black line, included in both panels. This trend is driven by the deleveraging of banks 
headquartered in UK, US, Switzerland and most euro area banking systems, which are 
redeeming international debt, on net basis. Other banks, headquartered in emerging (Brazil or 
China) and some advanced economies (Canada, Norway, or Sweden) have increasingly 
tapped international markets after the global financial crisis. However, their increase is not 
large enough to compensate the large and protracted redemption of debt by the aforementioned 
banking systems 
The net redemptions of global banks’ international debt might reflect different factors, 
ranging from temporary closures of financial markets in some banking systems, to higher 
funding costs, or, structural policy-driven changes in funding models. Whichever is the 
reason, they imply less towards less wholesale funding in international financial markets. 
There are broader changes in banks’ debt issuances after the global financial crisis, not 
easily grasped in aggregate data. Bank-level data suggests that debt issuances have 
experienced significant composition effects [see Van Rixtel and Gasparini (2013), for an 
analysis on euro area patterns]. Debt issuances have shifted towards secured funding. In 
some banking systems, government sponsored issuances increased, and a higher fraction 
of bond issuance was retained, to be used as collateral. As collateralized debt issuances 
2.2  INTERNATIONAL 
WHOLESALE FINANCING
SOURCE: BIS.
a The graph shows the recent evolution of banks net international bond issuances. International bond issuances are those issued outside the market where the 
ANQQNVDQQDRHCDR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3GDQDENQDHRRT@MBDRAXENQDHFMRTARHCH@QHDRAQ@MBGDR@QDBK@RRHjDC@BBNQCHMF
to the nationality of their banking group. Panel A shows net international issuances of banking systems which are deleveraging. These include mostly european 
banks, and the US. Euro area includes France, Germany, Italy, and Spain .Panel B shows net international issuances of banks tapping international markets, 
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global banks total issuances.
b Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
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increased substantially after the global financial crisis, asset encumbrance became a risk, 
amidst heightened counterpart credit risk, and ongoing regulatory reforms. The process had 
probably implications for banks cross-border activity, since reflected scarcer unsecured 
funding and, altogether, an increase in funding costs [CGFS (2013)]. Such analysis is, however, 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
Cross-border interbank liabilities have also contracted sharply, in particular between advanced 
economies banks. Panel 6.1 shows the evolution of cross-border interbank loans. Interbank 
liabilities, measured in GDP terms, reached to 90% of GDP in advanced economies at the 
end of 2008, and 60% excluding financial centres. Interbank liabilities also increased in 
emerging economies, although to lower levels – an average of 30% of GDP –. 
The outbreak of the global financial crisis was a turning point in cross-border interbank 
financing. Cross-border interbank liabilities have contracted protractedly, in every quarter 
since 2009. The stock of cross-border interbank liabilities in advanced economies has 
halved, while that of emerging economies is 35% lower than its peak. The reduction in 
cross-border interbank liabilities reflects, in some banking systems, less financing 
obtained from overseas. It can reflect as well lesser degree of liquidity management from 
financial hubs. 
The subdued activity of global banks from their banking offices operating in financial hubs is 
apparent in panel 6.2. Cross-border assets and liabilities booked by banking offices in 
financial centers increased sharply, and with great synchronization, in the period 2000-2008. 
They suffered a sharp reversal and, after a short-lived recovery, cross-border banking activity 
is contracting again. This is consistent with evidence of lower activity by global banks from 
financial centers. Banks headquartered in the euro area or Switzerland are amongst those 
reducing their cross-border interbank activity from United Kingdom [García-Luna and Van 
Rixtel (2014)].
SOURCE: BIS Locational Banking Statistics, national accounts.
a "QNRRANQCDQHMSDQA@MJKH@AHKHSHDR@UDQ@FDRSNBJRHM&#/SDQLRNE@CU@MBDCDBNMNLHDRNE@CU@MBDCDBNMNLHDRDWBKTCHMFjM@MBH@KBDMSQDRNE@KKBNTMSQHDR3GD
BG@QS@KRNRGNVRBG@MFDRHMBQNRRANQCDQHMSDQA@MJKH@AHKHSHDRHMSGDK@RSENTQPT@QSDQRLD@RTQDC@KRNQDK@SHUDSN&#/ENQ@CU@MBDCDBNMNLHDRVGHBGDWOK@HMSGD
K@QFDATHKCTOHMA@MJReDWSDQM@KMNMBNQDKH@AHKSHDR@MCSGDRTARDPTDMSBNMSQ@BSHNM
b  BSHUHSXNE(MSDQM@SHNM@KKX@BSHUDA@MJRHMBNTMSQHDRVGHBGG@UDED@STQDRNEjM@MBH@KGTAR'NMF*NMF+TWDLANTQF(BDK@MC(QK@MC2VHSYDQK@MC4MHSDC*HMFCNL
423GDBG@QSRGNVRBG@MFDRHMHMSDQM@SHNM@KKX@BSHUDA@MJRBQNRRANQCDQ@RRDSR@MCKH@AHKHSHDRANNJDCHMjM@MBH@KGTARRGNVMHM42LHKKHNMSGDXG@UD@QDL@QJ@AKD
RXMBGQNMHY@SHNM@MC@QDDWODQHDMBHMF@RHY@AKDBNMSQ@BSHNM(MSDQM@SHNM@KKX@BSHUDA@MJRHRRT@MBDREQNLjM@MBH@KGTAG@UD@RHLHK@QO@SSDQMSGDXHMBQD@RDCADENQD
SGDFKNA@KjM@MBH@KBQHRHR@MC@QDBTQQDMSXBNMSQ@BSHMF
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In this section we investigate econometrically the drivers of cross-border banking activity 
building on the previous work of Bruno and Shin (2013). Our focus lies on the statistical 
and economic significance of different measures of global banks reliance on international 
wholesale funding. The results confirm that cross-border bank investments depend 
positively on global banks international wholesale funding. As for the economic significance, 
the sharp contraction in banks’ international wholesale funding explains 1/3 of the cross-
border bank flows reduction after the global financial crisis.
International banks are shedding cross-border bank assets, in parallel to their contraction 
in wholesale international funding. The process is impacting on countries’ international 
financing, as shown in Chart 7. 
In this chart, dots represent countries’ reliance on different sources of funding, measured in 
GDP terms, before and after the crisis (horizontal and vertical axis). Dots above the bisecting 
line reflect a country is relying more on a given source of financing after the crisis. We break 
down international financing between cross-border claims on non-banks (panel 7.1), 
cross-border interbank claims (panel 7.2), financial corporations’ international issuances 
(panel 7.3), and non-financial corporations’ international issuances (panel 7.4). This 
highlights how countries financing patterns are changing.
3  Drivers of cross-border 
bank flows. 
Econometric analysis
3.1 PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE
SOURCES: BIS, International Banking Statistics; BIS Securities Statistics; national accounts, owns elaboration.
a /QD@MCONRSBQHRHR@UDQ@FDU@KTDNED@BGU@QH@AKD-NMjM@MBH@KBNQONQ@SHNMRHMSDQM@SHNM@KANMCHRRT@MBDR%HM@MBH@KBNQONQ@SHNMRHMSDQM@SHNM@KANMCHRRT@MBDR
Cross-border claims on non-banks and Cross-border claims on banks. Pre-crisis average is the average of 2005, 2006, and 2007; Post-crisis average is the 
average of 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013. Each dot represents a country: advanced countries are represented in blue, Emerging Europe countries in green, and 
the rest of emerging economies (Asian, Latin American, and a number of countries of Africa & Middle East) in red. If points are above the bisecting line, countries 
G@UDQDKHDCLNQDNMSG@SRNTQBDNEjM@MBHMF@ESDQSGDBQHRHR
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Cross-border bank flows on non-banks headquartered in advanced economies and emerging 
Europe are contracting – panel 7.1 –, where most dots are below the bisecting line. The 
impact on other emerging economies, represented as red dots, is less clear-cut. Cross-border 
interbank flows have contracted even more sharply, in particular vis-a-vis advanced 
economies – panel 7.2 –. As for financial corporations debt issuances in international markets, 
there are net redemptions in most advanced economies – panel 7.3 –, although with some 
relevant outliers. This contrasts with the large international issuances by financial corporations’ 
headquartered in number of emerging economies. These stylized facts are consistent with the 
more aggregate pattern show in Chart 2. Finally, panel 7.4 shows how non-financial 
corporations’ international debt issuances have increased. The increase is common to non-
financial companies headquartered in emerging and advanced economies alike, although 
their size is still low, measured in GDP terms. We delve into this trend in Section 4. 
We turn now to the econometric analysis on the drivers of cross-border bank flows. Our 
panel data includes 56 countries – advanced, emerging, and financial hubs – which are 
listed in Appendix 1. We use quarterly data for the period 1991-2013. We construct 
measures of quarterly cross-border bank investments building on the BIS International 
Banking Statistics: cross-border investments in all sectors (Table 6A); and on banks (cross-
border interbank claims, constructed as the difference between Tables 6A and 6B). We 
define the dependent variable in Section 3.3.
To investigate the relevance of global banks funding patterns as drivers of cross-border 
bank flows, we construct a number of proxies, detailed in Table 1. 
Changes in outstanding volumes of global banks international bonds are deemed a 
measure of banks’ international funding patterns. Global banks international bonds 
increased before the global financial crisis, and are experiencing a protracted contraction 
afterwards. We construct this variable using BIS Securities data to test if this is driving 
global banks cross-border deleveraging. 
Branches in the US were also a source of funding for global banks using centralized funding 
models. We construct a measure of the Net Due To positions share in branches total assets, 
using the Assets and Liabilities of U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks (4.30). The 
evolving relevance of centralized funding models are reflected in the sharp changes in NDT 
positions. Branches Net Due To positions vis-à-vis their banking groups were large and 
positive during the period 2000-2008. The declining importance of branches as funding 
vehicles is reflected in the protracted reduction in creditor NDT positions. We expect 
decreases in net creditor NDT positions to impact negatively on cross-border bank flows. 
3.2 DATA ISSUES
SOURCE: Author's elaboration.
Description Source
Banks international 
issuances (+)
Quarterly change in the outstanding total stock of banks 
international debt securities
BIS, Table 12
US branches 
funding (+)
Quarterly change in the net due to position of branches 
of foreign banks, vis-a-vis their banking groups (positive if creditor)
Reserva Federal, Assets and Liabilities of 
U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign 
Banks (4.30)
Broker Dealer 
Leverage (+)
Quarterly change in the, leverage of the broker-dealer sector US, 
measured as the ratio (liabilities plus equity)/equity
Flow of Funds, L. 128
MEASURING GLOBAL BANKS INTERNATIONAL FUNDING. MAIN VARIABLES TABLE 1 
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Branches have not separate capital, so it is not possible to compute their leverage. 
However, there are shifts in branches risk-appetite. Their current liquidity hoarding, 
described in Section 2.1, is an extreme example. US broker-dealer leverage is considered 
a proxy of branches activity, since both institutional sectors are influenced by similar 
factors [Bruno and Shin (2013)]. Therefore we compute the leverage of the US Broker-
Dealer sector, using the Flow of Funds, and introduce it as proxy of global banks activity 
in wholesale funding markets. Higher leverage is expected to affect positively cross-
border bank flows. 
Cross-border bank flows are expected to depend on other global factors, not directly 
related to global banks funding patterns. These variables include world GDP growth, or 
global risk aversion (measured by the VIX). The VIX can be interpreted a measure of global 
banks risk-aversion. Alternatively the VIX can be considered a proxy of banks’ funding 
costs in wholesale markets. 
We include also a number of country-specific variables which are also expected to influence 
cross-border bank flows. The selection is guided by previous work on determinants on 
capital flows – pull factors –. The variables included as control variables are domestic GDP 
growth, the current account balance, the sovereign rating, and measures of fiscal soundness 
(fiscal balance and public debt). Countries with sounder economic fundamentals are 
expected to receive more cross-border bank flows. 
We estimate the following equation:
xb it = xb t-1 + ´f (local it ) + g (global t ) +  i + y t + ϵ it                                         [1]
where cross-border bank flows xb t-1 on country i, at quarter t, depend on a vector of 
country-specific variables f(local it ) and a vector of global variables g(globalt). The latter 
includes the measures of global banks funding patterns, and the remaining global factors 
(VIX, and world GDP growth). The right-hand side variables include a lag of the dependent 
variable, xbit-1, country-fixed effects, and time effects. 
Cross-border bank flows xbit are quarterly flows, measured in GDP terms, and standardized 
at the country-level. To standardize them we divide cross-border bank flows by their historical 
(country-specific) standard deviation, following Broner et al. (2013). 
xb it = ( XB it  ⁄ PIB it ) / sd xb it                                                                           [2]
This standardization is important. Cross-border bank flows received by countries, even 
scaled by their GDP, have remarkable differences in size and volatility. This is apparent in 
Chart 8 which plots the historical country-specific volatility of bank flows: volatility of 
cross-border bank flows on non-banks is plotted in the horizontal axis, against the 
interbank flows volatility, in the vertical axis. Each dot represents a country. 
Panel 8.1 shows volatility of advanced and emerging economies, which are represented with 
blue and red dots, respectively. It is apparent how volatility is much higher in advanced 
economies. The chart also shows that cross-border interbank claims are more volatile than 
claims on non-banks, since most of the dots are above the bisecting line. Panel 8.2 shows the 
volatility of cross-border bank flows to financial hub. It is much higher than that of advanced 
and emerging economies – to ease the comparison the average volatility of cross – border 
bank flows to these countries is included. 
3.3  ECONOMETRIC 
FRAMEWORK
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Cross-border bank flows, once standardized, can be interpreted as deviations from each 
country-specific dynamics. In Section 3.5, we rescale the results to gauge their economic 
size in percentage points of GDP. 
We estimate equation [1] with system-GMM. We instrument the three variables deemed 
endogenous, which are the lag of the dependent variable, domestic GDP growth, and the 
current account balance.5 In columns 1 to 3 our dependent variable are cross-border bank 
flows on all counterparts. 
Column 1 estimates the model for all countries. The results confirm that cross-border bank 
flows depend on global banks reliance on international, wholesale, funding. Cross-border 
bank flows depend positively on global banks issuances in international markets. Therefore, 
net redemptions of banks international debt – Chart 2 – have as a by-product cross-border 
asset shedding. 
Cross-border bank flows depend positively on increases in the NDT position of branches 
of foreign banks in the US vis-à-vis their banking groups. It implies that global banks have 
more lending resources. Accordingly the sharp reversal in the funds channelled from US 
markets to non-US global banks implies less cross-border banking activity. Finally, the 
leverage of the US broker-dealer sector, a proxy of activity of wholesale, international 
banks, also has the expected positive impact on cross-border bank flows. 
As for the rest of global variables, cross-border bank flows depend positively on world global 
growth. VIX increases impact negatively on cross-border bank investments. Cross-border 
investments can be impaired by global banks heightened risk-aversion, proxied by the VIX. 
Country-specific variables also are important determinants of cross-border bank flows. 
Countries with higher GDP growth rates attract more bank flows, as do countries with 
3.4 MAIN RESULTS
SOURCE: BIS (Locational Banking Statistics).
a 2S@MC@QCCDUH@SHNMNEPT@QSDQKXkNVRLD@RTQDCHM&#/SDQLRENQSGDODQHNC00
b $@BGCNSQDOQDRDMSR@BNTMSQX
c  UDQ@FDUNK@SHKHSXNEDLDQFHMF@MC@CU@MBDCBNTMSQHDRHMBKTCHMFHMSGDR@LOKD
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5  We use system-GMM to estimate all specifications. We introduce time dummies to control for cross-country 
correlation. As for the number of lags used as instruments, we choose it so as to avoid having too many 
instruments (as detailed in the tables). Following standard rules-of-thumb, we target a number of instrument 
similar to N [Roodman (2006)]. Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests are reported, while Hansen tests (not shown) 
do not reject the null hypothesis that overidentifying restrictions are valid. 
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better sovereign rating. Public debt to GDP ratios are negatively associated with cross-
border bank investments received. Other variables deemed as potentially relevant, such as 
current account balance or the fiscal balance, are not statistically significant. 
We conduct a number of robustness checks. First, we investigate if the results hold in different 
country samples. In column 2 we exclude financial centres. These countries are not strictly 
capital flows recipient countries, and share features with hubs which banks use to manage 
liquidity routinely. Therefore their correlation with funding matters could be endogenous, and 
not a connection between funding and asset shedding. We find very similar results.
In column 3, we estimate the model excluding also euro area countries. Financial integration in 
Europe was boosted by the introduction of the euro. It was mostly bank-based, and had very 
SOURCE: Author's elaboration.
a Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Equations estimated using system GMM. Variables treated as endogenous are the lag of the 
dependent variable, domestic GDP growth, and the current account. We choose the number of lags used as instruments in order to avoid instrument proliferation, 
and taking into account residual autocorrelation paterns. In columns 1 and 3 the minimum lag is 1 and 2 for the levels and transformed equation; and the maximum 
K@FHRLNCHjDCCDODMCHMFNMSGDMTLADQNEFQNTOR@MCQDRODBSHUDKX(MBNKTLMK@FRSN@QDTRDCHMSGDSQ@MRENQLDCDPT@SHNM'@MRDM3DRSRMNS
QDONQSDCCNMNSQDIDBSSGDMTKKGXONSGDRHRSG@SNUDQHCDMSHEXHMFQDRSQHBSHNMR@QDDWNFDMNTR"NKTLMDWBKTCDRjM@MBH@KBDMSQDR"NKTLMDWBKTCDRjM@MBH@KBDMSQDR
and euro area countries.
Dependent variable is crossborder bank kows
3Ntal
1
Excluding jnancial centres
2
& Excluding euro area
3
Countryspecijc variables
0.399*** 0.236 0.417**
[0.121] [0.151] [0.162]
0.01* 0.033*** 0.021
[0.010] [0.010] [0.037]
0.053** 0.042* 0.050
[0.024] [0.024] [0.036]
0.067*** 0.061*** 0.059***
[0.010] [0.012] [0.013]
0.003** 0.003 0.004
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
0.004 0.006 0.000
[0.013] [0.012] [0.026]
Global variables
0.177*** 0.5*** 0.161***
[0.030] [0.034] [0.03]
0.247*** 0.19* 0.121
[0.] [0.107] [0.109]
0.109*** 0.104*** 0.106***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.026]
1.927*** 1.706*** 2.200***
[0.400] [0.461] [0.444]
1.356*** 1.225** 1.51***
[0.431] [0.499] [0.544]
    Observations 3,977 3,413 2,542
    Number of id 54 46 36
    Instruments 56 53 44
    3est ArellanoBond AR1 0.36 0.0325 0.25
    3est ArellanoBond AR2 0.352 0.739 0.311
    Fiscal balance to GDP
    Lag Bank kows GDP terms, standarized
    Current account GDP terms
    Domestic GDP growth
    Standard & Poors Rating
    Public debt to GDP
    World GDP
    VIX
    BrokerDealer Leverage
    US branches funding
    Banks international issuances
CROSS-BORDER BANK FLOWS (a) TABLE 2 
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specific features. Retail banking remained mostly national and interbank lending, or direct 
cross-border investments boomed [Sapir and Wolff (2013)]. Since the outbreak of the crisis 
cross-border interbank flows are experiencing a particularly protracted contraction. Financial 
fragmentation can be attributed to an important extent to idiosyncratic developments 
[Millaruelo and del Río (2013)]. Therefore it is sensible to test whether the results are robust 
to the exclusion of euro area countries. Most of them hold in this alternative data sampling, 
although cross-border bank flows do not depend on the VIX. 
In Table 3 we present additional robustness checks. First, we analyze alternative time 
spans. We expect cross-border bank flows to be more dependent on global financial 
conditions in periods in which centralized funding models were more prominent. Therefore, 
3.5  ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS 
CHECKS. TIME SPANS, AND 
SECTOR OF COUNTERPART
SOURCE: Author's elaboration.
a Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Equations estimated using system GMM. Variables treated as endogenous are the lag of the 
dependent variable, domestic GDP growth, and the current account. We choose the number of lags used as instruments in order to avoid instrument proliferation, 
and taking into account residual autocorrelation paterns. In columns 1 and the minimum lag is 1 and 2 for the levels and transformed equation; and the maximum 
lag is 8 and 10. In columns 3 and 4 the minimum lag is 2 and 3 for levels and transfromed equation, and the maximum lag is 8 and 10, respectively). Hansen-Tests 
MNSQDONQSDCCNMNSQDIDBSSGDMTKKGXONSGDRHRSG@SNUDQHCDMSHEXHMFQDRSQHBSHNMR@QDDWNFDMNTR KKDRSHL@SHNMRDWBKTCDjM@MBH@KBDMSQDR@MCDTQN@QD@BNTMSQHDR
Dependent variable is:
Until 1Q2010
(1)
1999-2010
(2)
All sample
(3)
 1999-2010
(4)
Country-specijc variables
-0.423*** -0.565*** -0.478* -0.587***
[0.145] [0.186] [0.246] [0.190]
0.011 0.007 -0.113*** -0.105***
[0.038] [0.042] [0.038] [0.033]
0.025 0.011 0.033 -0.000
[0.032] [0.062] [0.048] [0.090]
0.067*** 0.092*** 0.045** 0.058**
[0.015] [0.017] [0.021] [0.027]
-0.008** -0.010* 0.002 0.000
[0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004]
-0.015 -0.029 0.050 0.044
[0.027] [0.035] [0.033] [0.040]
Global variables
0.367*** 0.425*** 0.133*** 0.356***
[0.066] [0.085] [0.047] [0.112]
-0.347*** -0.437*** -0.266** -0.558***
[0.133] [0.159] [0.113] [0.193]
0.120*** 0.128*** 0.098*** 0.105***
[0.028] [0.028] [0.032] [0.035]
-2.666*** -2.920*** -1.801*** -2.270***
[0.422] [0.511] [0.450] [0.464]
1.515** 1.874* 1.142 1.648
[0.707] [1.068] [0.943] [1.189]
    Observations 2,049 1,352 2,526 1,352
    Number of id 34 34 36 34
    Instruments 36 40 41 33
    Test Arellano-Bond AR(1) 0.262 0.693 0.367 0.464
    Test Arellano-Bond AR(2) 0.325 0.221 0.360 0.0721
    World GDP
    VIX
    BrokerDealer Leverage
    US branches funding
    Banks international issuances
    Current account - GDP terms
    Domestic GDP growth
    Standard & Poors Rating
    Public debt to GDP
    Fiscal balance to GDP
Cross-border bank claims Interbank claims
    Lag Bank kows - GDP terms, standarized
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS (a) TABLE 3 
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we estimate the model for different sub-periods: column 1 presents results of sub-period 
1991-2010; while column 2 uses period 1999-2010. This is the period when centralized 
funding models were more prevalent. 
The results hold, qualitatively, in both sub-periods. Interestingly, a number of global variables 
have higher economic size. The coefficient of the VIX – the measure of funding costs in 
wholesale markets or global risk aversion – is highest in the period 1999-2010. We find a 
similar increase in the economic size our three measures of global banks funding patterns. 
World GDP growth has also a stronger economic impact on cross-border bank flows.
Finally, in columns 3 and 4 we use as dependent variable cross-border interbank claims 
(claims on banks). They are the most volatile source of cross-border bank financing. The 
results for the whole time span are qualitatively very similar to our benchmark results. 
The results obtained in the sub-period 1999-2010 are also stronger.6 The main difference 
is the non-significance coefficient of banks international issuances. Cross-border 
interbank claims have probably shorter maturities, and they might be associated with 
shorter-term liabilities. 
We investigate next the economic size of our main results (Table 2, first column, obtained 
excluding financial centres). In order to measure the quantitative importance of the shifting 
funding patterns of global banks, we classify drivers in four groups: global banks funding 
patterns, other global factors, country-specific factors, time effects. Non-significant 
variables are included in the unexplained variation. We compute the average impact of 
each group of variables at a country-level. Then we average this impact for advanced and 
emerging economies, and compute their contribution to cross-border bank flows before 
and after the crisis (pre: 1Q2000-3Q2008, post: 1Q2010-3Q2013). Since cross-border 
bank flows, and its drivers, are measured in terms of (country-specific) standard deviations, 
we need to rescale them. Therefore we multiply them by the average standard deviation of 
cross-border bank flows in emerging and advanced economies. Chart 9 shows the 
decomposition, for advanced and emerging economies (panel 9.1 and 9.2, respectively). 
We present the information annualized. 
Cross-border bank flows have experienced a sizable contraction, which is stronger in 
advanced economies. In these countries, cross-border bank flows are, on average, 20 pp 
of GDP lower than before the global financial crisis.
The contraction of international wholesale funding represents the key driver. Indeed, global 
banks new funding patterns predict a contraction in flows twice as important as the observed. 
Other global factors (including world GDP growth and risk aversion) explain 15% of that 
reduction. As for country-specific variables, they have less impact: they explain 20% of 
banking fragmentation, reflecting lower economic growth and worsening in sovereign rating. 
Time dummies have a large, positive, impact, this way partially counterbalancing the negative 
impact of global variables on cross-border bank flows after the crisis.
This sizable impact of time-effects on cross-border bank flows suggests that an unobserved, 
global factor, has partially smoothed the retrenchment of wholesale-oriented global banks 
headquartered in advanced economies.7 This could reflect that, short after the crisis, a 
3.6 ECONOMIC SIZE
6  Coefficients measure the impact of variables on standardized cross-border bank flows. Since interbank flows are 
more volatile, all variables have stronger impact on them, measured in pp of GDP (see Chart 8).
7  If the model is estimated removing the time dummies, the coefficients of global variables become much smaller 
– for instance, the coefficient of the broker-dealer leverage (the most important single variable) halves –.
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number of banking systems engaged in a cross-border expansion, less dependent on 
wholesale international funding. Emerging markets banking systems have expanded 
overseas, to an important extent relying on their domestic retail funding (CGFS (2014). 
In areas such as Asia-Pacific, their cross-border activity has picked strongly, so that 
intrarregional banks represent the bulk of cross-border credit. Japanese banks overseas 
expansion has also increased, financed either with corporate deposits, or currency swaps 
of their domestic currency retail funding [Lam (2013)]. Global banking after the crisis is 
defined, therefore, by a sharp contraction of wholesale-funding cross-border activity, and a 
modest decoupling of cross-border bank flows from these factors. 
The retrenchment of international banks through cross-border asset-shedding is impacting 
strongly on financial integration. Banks are losing importance as providers of cross-border 
credit. International capital markets are gaining relative importance. In some geographical 
areas, international capital markets have also increased in absolute terms. This trend 
towards financial disintermediation in international markets is depicted in Chart 10. 
International financing is break down between funding obtained from banks, and from 
capital markets. Cross-border bank claims are investments by banks operating overseas, 
on residents in the recipient economy. These investments can be either on banks, or on 
non-banks (all other sectors). International issuances are those by residents in the country, 
in all markets, excepting the domestic. Therefore, they are not necessarily associated with 
balance of payment flows. We present separately issuances by sovereigns and by other 
institutional sectors (including banks, non-financial corporations, and other financial 
institutions (bonds). Capital flows are measured relative to GDP, as a sum of the last four 
quarters. In other to account different geographical patterns, we show evolutions in the 
euro area, emerging economies, and emerging Europe.
Panel 10.1 shows that cross-border bank flows are experiencing a protracted contraction, 
particularly severe in interbank financing. International issuances have hold better, 
although remain small in absolute terms. Financial fragmentation is sharper in the euro 
4  Financial 
disintermediation in 
international markets 
after the crisis 
SOURCE: Author's estimations.
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area – panel 10.2 –, where cross-border bank flows are contracting, and international 
issuances remain low. There are also sizable cross-border bank disinvestments vis-a-vis 
emerging Europe. Cross-border bank flows vis-à-vis the rest of emerging economies 
have hold better – panel 10.3 –, but have not recovered the pre-crisis levels. 
We investigate next additional features of international issuances in Emerging Asia and 
Latin America. In both areas, large private international debt issuances have counterbalanced 
the lesser importance of cross-border bank financing. This trend is driven by private 
issuances, as shown in panel 11.1, which breaks down international issuances by type of 
issuer: non-financial corporations, banks, other financial institutions, and sovereigns. Non-
financial corporations’ international issuances are three times larger than before the global 
financial crisis, while banks and other financial institutions international issuances have 
had a slightly increase. 
SOURCE: BIS Securities Statistics, Table 12.
a 3GDBG@QSRRGNVSGDBG@MFDRHMHMSDQM@SHNM@KjM@MBHMFNEBNTMSQHDR@ESDQSGDFKNA@KjM@MBH@KBQHRHRAXRGNVHMFSGDDUNKTSHNMNERDKDBSDCHSDLRBQNRRANQCDQ
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A@MJRBQNRRANQCDQHMSDQA@MJkNVRHMSDQM@SHNM@KHRRT@MBDRAXRNUDQDHFMRSGDQDRSNEHMSDQM@SHNM@KHRRT@MBDRHDAXA@MJRMNMjM@MBH@K
BNQONQ@SHNMR@MCNSGDQjM@MBH@KBNLO@MHDR(MSDQM@SHNM@KHRRT@MBDR@QDSGNRDHMVGHBGSGDHRRTDQHR@MNMQDRHCDMS@MCEQDPTDMSKXS@QFDSENQDHFMHMUDRSNQR3GDX
@QDBK@RRHEDC@BBNQCHMFSNSGDM@SHNM@KHSXNESGDTKSHL@SDNVMDQNESGDBNLO@MX3@AKD!(22DBTQHSHDR2S@SHRSHBR(MSDQM@SHNM@KHRRT@MBDR@QDMNSMDBDRR@QHKX
QDK@SDCSNA@K@MBDNEO@XLDMSB@OHS@KkNVR%#(VGHBGHRMNSRGNVMG@RADDMLNQDRS@AKDNUDQSHLD#@S@HRRGNVMHM&#/SDQLR@R@RHLOKD@UDQ@FDNESGD
BNTMSQHDRHMBKTCDCHMD@BGFQNTO
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS. RECENT EVOLUTION (a) CHART 10
-10 
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
CROSS-BORDER CLAIMS ON NON-BANKS 
CROSS-BORDER CLAIMS ON BANKS 
SOVEREIGN, INTERNATIONAL BONDS 
BONDS 
TOTAL INTERNATIONAL FINANCING 
 
 
% oE &#/  
    
 10.1 TOTAL 
-20 
-10 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
CROSS-BORDER CLAIMS ON NON-BANKS 
CROSS-BORDER CLAIMS ON BANKS 
SOVEREIGN, INTERNATIONAL BONDS 
BONDS 
TOTAL INTERNATIONAL FINANCING 
 
 
% oE &#/  
    
10.2 EURO AREA 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
CROSS-BORDER CLAIMS ON NON-BANKS 
CROSS-BORDER CLAIMS ON BANKS 
SOVEREIGN, INTERNATIONAL BONDS 
BONDS 
TOTAL INTERNATIONAL FINANCING 
% oE &#/  
  
 10.3 EMERGING ECONOMIES, EXCLUDING EMERGING EUROPE 
-10 
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
CROSS-BORDER CLAIMS ON NON-BANKS 
CROSS-BORDER CLAIMS ON BANKS 
SOVEREIGN, INTERNATIONAL BONDS 
BONDS 
TOTAL INTERNATIONAL FINANCING 
  
% oE &#/  
    
10.4 EMERGING EUROPE 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 128 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 26
Thus, international capital markets are gaining importance relative to cross-border banking 
in Latin America and Emerging Asia.8 The volumes of cross-border bank claims and 
outstanding international bonds are compared in panel 11.2. International bonds issued by 
non-sovereigns were half-the volume of cross-border bank claims until 2010. Bonds 
started to gain importance in 2010. Bonds issued in international markets already represent 
85% of cross-border bank claims in Emerging Asia and Latin America. 
This process of international financial disintermediation might pose risks. Capital markets can 
be a poor substitute of cross-border bank financing for some borrowers, for instance, SMEs. 
Firm-level data suggests that bond issuances are positively related to asset size. Panel 11.3 
shows international issuances by SMEs headquartered in emerging economies. It suggests 
they remain relatively low, despite a pick-up in 2011 and 2012. The sharp reduction in SMEs 
issuances in 2013 might reflect a shutdown of capital markets, which contrasts with the still 
resilient access of the whole population of firms. A proper assessment requires delving in 
recent trends in SMEs access to domestic bank credit, or domestic bond markets.
SOURCES: BIS (Securities and International Banking Statistics) and Bloomberg.
a +@SHM LDQHB@$LDQFHMF RH@ EQHB@@MC,HCCKD$@RS(MSDQM@SHNM@KHRRT@MBDRAQD@JCNVMAXHRRTDQA@MJRNSGDQjM@MBH@KHMRSHSTSHNMR.%(RMNMjM@MBH@K
corporations; and sovereigns.
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8  In the following analysis, Emerging Asia includes India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. Latin 
America includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru. Korea and China are not included, and have 
different patterns. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 129 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 26
On the other hand, large issuances can lead to build-up of potential risks and vulnerabilities 
in firms’ balance sheets. Aggregate evidence suggests that international issuances have 
been denominates mostly in dollars, although issuances in emerging market currencies 
have increased [Gruic and Wooldrdige (2013); see also IADB (2014) for an analysis of Latin 
America]. Large issuances by emerging-markets multinationals foreign-subsidiaries have 
also attracted attention, as a potencial source of hidden vulnerabilities. The historical 
record suggests, however, that this practice has not changed recently. Panel 11.4 shows 
issuances by domestically-based companies and their foreign subsidiaries in international 
markets. Their relative importance has remained constant, as depicted their ratio, which 
has remained stable all over the period. 
Financial integration goes ahead after the global financial crisis, although has experienced 
remarkable changes. Financial disintermediation has increased in international markets. 
This is particularly important in some emerging economies, where bonds’ weight in 
international financing has increased despite the relative resilience of cross-border banking. 
These countries obtain more funding from international capital markets, and less from 
cross-border banking
The lesser relative importance of global banks in international finance reflects their new 
business models, with decreasing importance of wholesale international financing. 
Regulation intended to achieve more stable funding patterns is among the prime drivers of 
a process which, therefore, has probably a permanent nature. Global banks which 
expanded overseas by establishing foreign subsidiaries, with local funding, have been 
more resilient [CIEPR (2012)]. 
A few banking systems depart from this general trend. For instance, emerging banking systems 
are expanding their cross-border activity, at a modest scale, and with less reliance on market-
based financing [CGFS (2014)]. Recently, issuances by banks headquartered in some emerging 
economies have picked up. This could eventually become a source of vulnerabilities, since 
represent wholesale financing which banks could use to finance domestic credit.
Financial disintermediation poses risks and uncertainties for financial stability. Cross-border 
bank flows have been historically a very volatile source of external financing, highly connected 
with global financial conditions. The impact of tightening of global financial conditions on 
bond holders and borrowers is more uncertain. Large issuances have been supported by 
factors which could be temporary, as easy monetary policy in advanced economies. The 
sharp sell-off in emerging economies bond markets after tapering talks in May 2013 suggests 
new channels of transmission of global financial conditions [Turner (2014)]. The financial 
stability implications of an eventual process of international financial disintermediation would 
depend on issues such as the investors risk profile, investment horizon, or leverage. 
As for borrowers, non-financial corporations’ large debt issuances have caused concern, 
since, based on historical records, are considered telltale signs of overborrowing or 
currency mismatches. However, understanding these risks requires a firm-level analysis 
on balance-sheet soundness. Issues such as companies leverage, rating, or an eventual 
substitution of banks financing by bond issuances are of interest. 
Finally, it is worth noting that, for some nonfinancial corporations, capital markets can be 
an imperfect substitute of cross-border bank financing. Access to capital markets is often 
more restrictive for SMEs. There is little evidence of an increasing access of SMEs to 
international financial, their ability to tap markets at large-scale is yet to be tested. 
5 Conclusions
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APPENDIX. DATA 
DESCRIPTION
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Country-specijc
    Current account to GDP -0.491 -1.013 6.166 -50.507 38.450 IMF, national accounts
    GDP growth 3.307 3.393 4.841 -54.819 119.429 National accounts
    Sovereign rating 15.992 16.000 4.571 0.000 21.000 S&P
    Public Debt to GDP 57.645 49.470 52.479 1.060 1,266.220 IMF, national accounts
    Primary balance to GDP -1.974 -1.898 4.784 -140.620 20.183 IMF, national accounts
Global variables
    World GDP growth 2.644 2.823 1.379 -2.832 4.758 IMF, WEO
    VIX, qoq change -0.005 -0.019 0.195 -0.489 0.847 CBOE
    Broker Dealer Leverage 15.050 13.612 5.903 5.596 30.680 Flow of Funds, L.128
    NDT position, qoq change 0.001 -0.002 0.048 -0.153 0.387 Structure and Share Data, 4.30
    Banks international issuances 0.035 0.041 0.039 -0.068 0.123 BIS Securities data
Cross-border bank kows measures
    All countries
        On all counterparts 4.013 1.074 33.923 -848.896 867.958 BIS IBS, national accounts
        On banks 2.626 0.537 29.497 -789.600 836.573 BIS IBS, national accounts
        On non-banks 1.387 0.440 13.307 -289.685 287.322 BIS IBS, national accounts
    Excluding Financial centres
        On all counterparts 1.374 0.836 7.993 -99.395 78.888 BIS IBS, national accounts
        On banks 0.782 0.408 6.978 -129.646 74.818 BIS IBS, national accounts
        On non-banks 0.592 0.350 3.322 -38.703 53.224 BIS IBS, national accounts
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS TABLE A.1
SOURCE: Author's elaboration. 
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Domestic GDP 
growth
-0.2343 1
Standard & Poors 
rating
-0.8244 0.2967 1
Public Debt to 
GDP
0.8202 -0.2735 -0.8339 1
Fiscal Balance to 
GDP
0.0094 0.5242 -0.024 0.0152 1
World GDP growth -0.1228 0.4279 0.0307 0.0126 0.3977 1
VIX 0.0018 0.0496 0.0146 -0.0483 0.0822 0.0975 1
Broker Dealer 
Leverage
0.072 0.1296 -0.0436 0.127 0.6341 0.4043 0.1453 1
US branches 
funding
0.0263 0.106 0.0343 -0.0714 -0.0823 -0.0124 0.5145 -0.2286 1
Banks international 
issuances
0.0048 0.1204 -0.0566 0.1591 0.4096 0.2837 -0.2392 0.5175 -0.21 1
CORRELATION MATRIX TABLE A.2
SOURCE: Author's elaboration.
 
 
